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1. INTRODUCTION
The war to liberate Latin America from financial exclusion has
begun and Peru has the potential role of Simon Bolivar's second
coming. In a country where only 20% of the population has a formal
bank account,' but 98% of its people own a mobile phone, 2 Peru
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believes that electronic money ("e-money") is as effective as Bolivar's
sword. While the rest of the region seems to be stalling regulatory
efforts, hoping for a success story that would justify e-money as a
financial inclusion tool, Peru has dedicated an important part of its
political agenda to creating an e-money regulatory framework that
would lure both bank and non-bank providers to invest in this project
as well as protect Peruvians' money. The result has been an intricate
scheme of rules that provide an interesting approach to the e-money
business, but that at the same time is oblivious to key aspects of the
business that are necessary to lead this effort to success.
Fortunately, many of the pieces forming that complex regula-
tory scheme are located in resolutions that do not have the rank of a
law enacted by Peru's Congress, meaning that they can be easily
amended without going through the complex political process that law
amendments entail.3 With a few key corrections, Peru's e-money laws
and regulations can become the boilerplate for many other regional e-
money regulatory projects. However, in order to claim victory, the
rules of the game must afford business players a chance to be profit-
able while providing acceptable levels of protection to consumers.
Fortunately, Peru can find guidance for all those key corrections in
Kenya, a country that is, thus far, the only unquestionable e-money
success story in the world.4
Since 2007, Kenya has been the cornerstone of the e-money
world. That year, the telecommunications operator Safaricom launched
its M-PESA service, an electronic wallet linked to a mobile phone that
allowed Kenyans to deposit and transfer funds from mobile to mobile,
1 THE WORLD BANK, THE LITTLE DATA BOOK ON FINANCIAL INCLUSION 119 (2012),
available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/12252/
68169.pdf7sequence=1.
2 See ROBERTA PRESCOTT, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, PERU: A MOBILE MARKET SET FOR
GROWTH 2 (2013).
3 See Constituci6n Politica del Peru [Peru's Political Constitution], Diario Oficial El
Peruano [E.P.], 1 Jan. 1994 art. 103-109 (Peru) (detailing the process that a law
amendment must go through before it becomes binding).
4 See Wolfgang Fengler, How Kenya Became a World Leader for Mobile Money, THE
WORLD BANK BLOGS (Jul. 16, 2013), http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/how-kenya-
became-a-world-leader-for-mobile-money.
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among other things.5 M-PESA's success opened the door for other
providers to enter the market.6 The rest of the story would put Kenya
into the e-money Hall of Fame, if one existed: in a country were only
19% of its population had a formal bank account, 74% of adult Kenyans
have subscribed to some kind of e-money service; today, there are
more e-money accounts than actual bank accounts, carrying out more
than 50 million transactions a month.7 This is financial inclusion at its
finest.
In the shadows of M-PESA's rise to stardom, the Kenyan
government, through its central bank ("CBK"), played a fundamental
role. The CBK patiently studied e-money providers' every move,
learning from their practices, exposing their weaknesses, all while
subtly exercising control. It was only after extensive analysis that it
decided to regulate, more than six years after M-PESA's launch. This
laissez-faire approach created an environment ripe for financial
inclusion and allowed for smart regulation that benefits the entire
ecosystem.
Peru's approach is completely at odds with Kenya's method.
The Peruvian government, mostly through its banking regulatory
agency ("SBS"), entered into a regulatory frenzy with the aim of
protecting Peruvians from all possible risk, thereby overburdening e-
money investors with excessive controls. While it is too late to replicate
Kenya's laissez-faire environment in Peru, there remain three key
lessons to be learned from Kenya's expertise. If Peru listens to Kenya's
success story and acts promptly, the promise of financial inclusion in
Peru, and perhaps Latin America, may be fulfilled.
II. LESSON 1: WAIT, STUDY, ACT. THE ISSUE OF OVERREGULATION
The CBK remained silent but aware of e-money providers for
over six years. Rather than being a regulatory period, this was an
Simone di Castri & Lara Gidvani, The Kenyan Journey to Digital Financial Inclusion,
GSM Ass'N (Aug. 1, 2013) http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/MMIvU-Infographic-The-Kenyan-journey-to-digital-financial-
inclusion.pdf.
6 Other e-money providers in Kenya include Zap (Zain, Yu Mobile (Essar Telecom),
Iko Pesa (Orange), Tangaza Pesa (Mobile Pay Ltd.), and Airtel Money (Bharti Airtel).
ALLIANCE FOR FIN. INCLUSION, CASE STUDY: ENABLING MOBILE MONEY TRANSFER:
TIE CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA'S TREATMENT OF M-PESA 1-2 (2010).
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analysis period during which the new market developed. Once this
development was underway, the CBK regulated in a smart, no-
nonsense fashion, tailored to the needs of both Kenyans and providers.
On the other hand, way before the first e-money provider launched in
the country, Peru went on to regulate extensively.8 The result has been
a long period of adaptation, confusion, and concern for those
interested in entering the market.
Kenya's experience teaches Peru that, when dealing with
novel markets like e-money, it might be better to wait for it to develop,
study how providers operate, and then act with regulation that
considers the business' reality, while providing an acceptable level of
protection for consumers. After all, without successful providers, there
would be no market to regulate.
A. Kenya's regulatory approach
Kenya's approach to regulating e-money was to simply not
regulate until sufficient information about the business became
available; after all, e-money was still in its formative stages, at least in
Kenya.9 The development of this approach runs parallel to the rise of
M-PESA, so much so that it was actually Safaricom who first engaged
the CBK to talk about an e-money service accessed through mobile
phones in June of 2006.10 The time could not have been more
appropriate. Just a few months before, the CBK received a Financial
Access Survey that remarked on Kenya's poor financial inclusion
forecast, indicating that only one third of Kenyans were formally
banking." Coupled with statistics showing that for every Kenyan with
access to a bank account, at least two others had access to a mobile
phone, 12 Safaricom's proposal created a potential win-win situation:
the incumbent Kenyan government would benefit politically by
helping the less privileged, Kenyans would benefit by gaining access to
financial services previously out of reach and Safaricom would obtain
a healthy return on their investment while boosting customer loyalty.
See infra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
9 DI CASTRI & GIDvANI, supra note 5, at 1.
10 ALLIANCE FOR FIN. INCLUSION, supra note 7, at 1, 3.
11 Id. at 1-2.
12 Id. at 2.
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Once the CBK knew about Safaricom's project, it acted.
Instead of locking itself up in a room to conceive painstaking regula-
tion, it used a far wiser tactic of waiting and studying. For almost a
year, the CBK engaged M-PESA on several occasions, inquiring about
as many details as possible regarding its platform and business case,
even asking M-PESA to modify certain aspects of its intended opera-
tions model in order to mitigate risks and preparing a risk mitigation
program that Safaricom applied to M-PESA's pilot program.13 The
purpose of this investigative effort was not to create a basis upon
which a regulatory scheme would be built; instead, the CBK opted to
issue a "No Objection Letter," the equivalent of patting Safaricom's
shoulder and wishing them good luck with its new e-money
business.14
M-PESA went on to become an astounding success and the e-
money market flourished. Today, there are more than 23 million
mobile money users, representing 74 % of Kenya's adult population.15
But throughout this process, Kenya's government did not remain idle.
M-PESA, and other providers that came after, were constantly
monitored. For instance, in the midst of money laundry allegations, the
Minister of Finance urged the CBK to audit M-PESA;16 also, the CBK
was granted express power to monitor all payments systems,
including electronic ones, by the National Payments Systems Bill.17
The CBK finally became more proactive in 2013 by issuing a
draft E-Money Regulation (the "CBK's Regulation").18 Judging by all
the time spent and information gathered since M-PESA's launch, it
would not have been preposterous to think that the CBK would come
up with not one but several pieces of regulation, each with the level of
complexity of a space shuttle navigation manual. Nevertheless, the
CBK came up with a simple fifteen-page document, fifteen clauses
long, filled with broad mandates a compilation of all the basic precepts
gathered throughout the years to conduct healthy e-money operations.
13 Di Castri & Gidvani, supra note 5.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 ALLIANCE FOR FIN. INCLUSION, supra note 7, at 1, 12.
17 The National Payment System Act, (2011) Cap. 39 § 7 (Kenya).
" CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, http://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/public-
consultations (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
2013 35
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMp. L. REV.
Moreover, the CBK opened this draft to comments and questions so e-
money providers had a chance to persuade the CBK to cure any
undesired deviation from their status quo.19
B. Peru's regulatory approach
If Kenya's approach was to wait, study, and attack, then Peru's
approach was to attack, wait, and study. Peru's President Ollanta
Humala won the election on a campaign that promised social inclusion
and this promise fitted perfectly with the notion of financial inclusion
through e-money. 20 His administration had the opportunity to quickly
deliver on this campaign promise, without investing too much effort,
by taking advantage of an existing e-money law draft that was
presented to Congress prior to President Humala's rise to power.21
Seizing the opportunity, on January 16, 2013, he was finally able to
announce, during a televised national address, that Congress enacted
the Law Regulating the Basic Characteristics of Electronic Money as a
Financial Inclusion Instrument ("Peru's E-Money Law" or "Law"). 22
Peru's E-Money Law is very short-only seven articles long-but it
covers most of the basics that would concern a regulator, namely: the
definition of e-money,23 entities that may be authorized to issue e-
money,24 rules for non-bank e-money issuers, 5 limits to transactions, 26
customer protection and funds safety. 27 Soon after its enactment, the
law was followed by E-Money Law Regulation ("Regulation"), 28 Six
19 CBK's consultation period ended on May 10, 2013.
20 Fox News Latino, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2011/06/06/ollanta-
humala-wins-peru-election-over-keiko-fujimori/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
21El Analista, http://www.elanalista.com/?q=node/142 (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
22 Ley No. 29985, 16 Jan. 2013, Ley que Regula las Caracteristicas BAsicas del Dinero
Electr6nico Como Instrumento de Inclusi6n Financiera [Law Regulating the Basic
Characteristics of Electronic Money as a Financial Instrument], DIARIO OFICIAL EL
PERUANO [E.P.], 17 Jan. 2013 (Peru).
23 Id. at art. 2.
24 Id. at art. 3.
25 Id. at art. 4.
26 Id. at art. 5(b).
27 Id. at art. 6.
28 Regulation to Law No 29985 [E-Money Law Regulation], DIARIO OFICIAL EL
PERUANO [E.P.], 14 May. 2013 (Peru).
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provisions that focused on defining e-money accounts, 29 e-money
issuing,30 and introducing the concept of correspondent cashiers (in
Spanish, cajeros coresponsales), Peru's version of e-money agents.31
This was the closest Peru ever came to emulating Kenya. After
the Law and the Regulation, Peru went on a regulatory spree. First, the
telecommunications governmental agency, OSIPTEL, composed a
detailed, 57-article draft resolution to ensure the Law's mandate that
all telecom services to e-money issuers be rendered on equal condi-
tions.32 Then, in June 2013, the SBS put the icing on the cake by issuing
two draft regulations: one dealing with e-money issuer's operations
("Regulation on Operations")33and one dealing with non-bank e-
money issuers ("Regulation on EEDEs"); 34 while also modifying an
existing regulation to include draft e-money related provisions on
correspondent cashiers ("Regulation on Correspondent Cashiers").35 A
grand total of six regulatory enactments were issued before the first
official launch of e-money in the country.
C. What should Peru do?
It may seem that learning from the lesson to wait, study and
act is now impossible for Peru, given its issuance of the Law and the
Regulation before the start of any e-money business in the country;
however, it can still make a few moves to reach a middle point
between its excessive regulation and Kenya's laissez-faire approach
2
9 Id. art. 4.
30 Id. art. 2.
31 Id. art. 6.
32 Resoluci6n de Consejo Directivo No. 043-2013-CD/OSPITEL de 21 March 2013,
DIARIO OFICIAL EL PERUANO [D.O.], April 1, 2013, p. 491957 (Peru).
33 Reglamento de Operaciones con Dinero Electr6nico, Resoluci6n S.B.S. No. 6283-
2013 [Regulation on E-Money Operations] Oct. 18, 2013 (Peru) [hereinafter Regula-
tion on Operations].
34 Reglamento de Las Empresas Emisoras de Dinero Electr6nico [Regulation on E-
Money Issuing Companies], Resoluci6n S.B.S. No. 6284-2013, Oct. 18, 2013 (Peru)
[hereinafter Regulation on EEDEs].
35 Reglamento de Apetura, Conversi6n, Traslado o Cierre de Oficinas, Uso de Locales
Compartidos, Automaticos y Cajeros Corresponsales [Regulation on Opening, conver-
sion, transferring or closing of offices, the use of shared premises, ATMs and tellers],
Resoluci6n S.B.S. No. 6285-2013, October 18, 2013 (Peru) [hereinafter Regulation on
Correspondent Cashiers].
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that can actually create an optimal e-money environment by affording
more predictability than Kenya while enabling a light regulatory
ecosystem that would lure investors.
Thus, Peru should put the e-money provisions in the Regula-
tion on Correspondent Cashiers and the entire Regulation on EEDEs
on hold, leaving only the Regulation on Operations in force and subject
to changes that this article will discuss subsequently. This does not
mean that the SBS should throw away all work done on correspondent
cashiers and non-bank e-money issuers. Rather, it should keep this
work on the backburner to give the market time to develop; then, as it
becomes more knowledgeable about the business and Peruvians'
needs, the SBS can go back to both drafts and issue piecemeal regula-
tions, addressing particular concerns that may arise and tailoring the
drafts to the practices of the market. This would relieve providers from
so many requirements in critical areas that are necessary to start
operations, such as authorization process for non-bank e-money
issuers under the Regulation on EEDEs3 6 and the agent authorization
process under the Regulation on Correspondent Cashiers.37
While it is important for the SBS to ensure non-bank e-money
issuers comply with minimal operating requirements, at this point,
there is no need to have such a sophisticated authorization process,
especially because the SBS does not have a clear idea about what is
actually required to operate an e-money business in Peru. The SBS
should simply mimic the CBK in its treatment of M-PESA: engage non-
bank e-money issuers, study their processes, make sure the issuers
comply with the minimums set by law, and authorize them.38
The same premises apply to the issue of agent authorization,
but rather than implementing a less rigid authorization process, the
SBS should simply do away with it altogether. The Regulation already
36 Regulation on EEDEs, supra note 34, at Second Final Disposition (enlisting a total
of twenty-one requirements to receive authorization from the SBS to operate as non-
bank e-money issuer under the Second Final Disposition of the Regulation on EEDEs,
most of them similar or equal to those financial institutions must comply with in order
to operate as banks).
37 Regulation on Correspondent Cashiers, supra note 35, at Annexes C and D
(providing a list of 16 requirements that e-money issuers must comply with in order to
receive authorization to operate with agents).
38 The Second Supplementary Disposition of the E-Money Law already empowers the
SBS to authorize non-bank e-money issuers to operate.
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states that e-money issuers are liable for any violation of the law
caused by its agents.39 Moreover, the SBS has the authority to conduct
inspections of these agents and ensure compliance.40 This should pro-
vide enough incentive for issuers to self-regulate.
III. LESSON 2: KNOW YOUR CUSTOMER. THE ISSUE OF CUSTOMER
REGISTRATION AND TRANSACTION LIMITS
Just as entrepreneurs must know the characteristics and needs
of their customers to thrive, regulators must be mindful of the nuances
behind the subjects who will be targeted by the precepts emanating
from their rule-making power. But when it comes to e-money services,
regulators must be mindful of an additional kind of customer
knowledge, this time involving customary financial due diligence
principles that they impose on financial institutions to have them
gather identification information about their customers (commonly
referred to as Know your Customer or "KYC" principles) 41 and
monitor transactional behavior to identify potential money laundry
operations (commonly referred to as Anti Money Laundry or "AML"
principles).42 The CBK masterfully dealt with these two faces of
customer knowledge by recognizing that uncontrolled user registra-
tion and no transaction limits would not pass muster under even the
most lenient KYC and AML principles, and by understanding that
financial inclusion would be impossible unless providers could
massively enroll Kenyans into e-money services and allow them to
freely dispose off their money.43 The CBK's approach consisted of
39 E-Money Law Regulation, supra note 28, at art. 6.
40 id.
41 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. 5318(I)(2) (2002) (laying down some mandatory KYC
principles to be adopted by the United State's Secretary of Treasury when regulating
on the area of customer identification).
42 See, e.g., 31 USC 5311 (2002) (enlisting certain AMIL reports applicable to United
State's financial institutions).
43 E-money service providers require large amounts of transactions in order to be
profitable. This is due to several factors, the most important being that the fees are
based on transaction amounts that are generally low. Fees charged to e-money
customers are usually expressed in cents of a dollar, leaving very small profit margins
to providers. Another important factor is the fees e-money providers pay to for services
they need to reach customers (e.g. telecommunications companies, transaction
2013 39
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giving providers just enough freedom to conduct registrations in a
way that would allow for massification, while ensuring that each
customer could be properly identified. 44 The CBK also imposed no
limits to transaction amounts while relying on providers' self-regula-
tion and reserving the power to investigate potential fraud concerns.45
Contrary to Kenya's experience, the SBS did not give itself
sufficient time to get to know its "customers." By imposing unneces-
sarily rigid KYC and AML requirements for customer registration and
transaction limits without being sensitive to the needs of providers and
the status quo of the market, the SBS is potentially shutting the door
for Peruvians' to join e-money services, thereby hampering financial
inclusion.
A. Kenya's customer registration and transaction limits approach
The CBK's strategy of overseeing without over-regulating
customer registration paid large dividends once the e-money business
became a legitimate success. This freedom allowed providers to enroll
clients without being constrained by rules that could burden their
internal registration procedure and annoy customers. A first impres-
sion of this approach may denote neglect or overindulgence towards
big private providers, but as it turns out, the CBK did exercise control
over such providers. The difference being that the CBK's control over
providers did not manifest itself in the conventional way, i.e. through
clear-cut regulatory mandates.
The CBK opted for a 'knowledge and oversight' strategy. Prior
to M-PESAS's launch, the CBK worked together with Safaricom and
asked them to explain how they would conduct the client registration
process and how they planned to address all potential KYC concerns;
by doing this, the CBK gathered knowledge.46 After its analysis, the
processing companies and banks), see infra note 51 (showing that an e-money
provider's income per transaction is very small).
44 See Simone di Castri, Tiered Risk-Based KYC: M-Shwari Successful Due
Diligence, GSMA (Jul. 8, 2013), http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/tiered-
risk-based-kyc-m-shwari-successful-customer-due-diligence.
45 ALLIANCE FOR FIN. INCLUSION, supra note 7, at 1, 6.
46 Ignacio Mas & Daniel Radcliffe, Mobile Payments Go Viral: M-PESA in Kenya, 32
CAPCO INST. J. FIN. TRANSFORM. 169, 172 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1593388.
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CBK simply authorized M-PESA to operate, while it retained the
power to oversee and ensure Safaricom's procedures were being
followed as agreed.47
M-PESA answered CBK's trust by self-regulating. It created
client registration rules that allowed for easy but controlled registra-
tion. Any Kenyan could open an M-PESA account by simply presen-
ting to the agent his Safaricom phone number plus any official
identification document -a Kenyan National ID, Passport, Military ID,
Diplomatic ID or Alien ID.48 From these official documents M-PESA
could obtain all basic information required to identify a customer-
first and last name, and date of birth. When the CBK finally went on to
actively regulate by issuing the CBK Regulation, it maintained the
status quo by not including any rules pertaining to customer
registration.
The CBK applied the same passive regulatory strategy
regarding transaction limits, at least initially. M-PESA went on to
impose limits that have been updated regularly. 49 For instance, the
maximum account balance at any time is KES100,000 (USD 1,144.42 at
the exchange rate of 87,38 KES per USD);50 the maximum single-
transaction amount is KES70,000 (USD 801.10 at the exchange rate of
87,38 KES per USD)51 and the maximum daily transaction limit is
KES140,000 (USD 1,602.20 at the exchange rate of 87,38 KES per
USD).52
Recently, the CBK has been more active it is control of e-money
providers' transaction limits. For instance, Clause 7.1 of the CBK
Regulation establishes a single-transaction limit of KES 75,000 (USD
858.34 at the exchange rate of KES 87,38 per USD) and a maximum
monthly transaction limit of KES 1,000,000 (USD 11,444.45 at the
exchange rate of KES 87,38 per USD);53 furthermore, on April 15, 2013,
47 di Castri & Gidvani, supra note 5.
48 How to Register for M-Pesa, SAFARICOM, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-
pesa/how-to-register (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
49 M-Pesa Tariffs, SAFARICOM, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/m-pesa-




53 E-Money Regulation, CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, http://www.centralbank.go.ke/
index.pIp/public-consultations (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (at clause 7.1).
20 1 3 41
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
the Kenyan press announced that the CBK would propose regulation
that would allow it to investigate daily transactions exceeding KES
100,000.54
B. Peru's customer registration and transaction limits approach
Without consulting aspiring bank or non-bank e-money
issuers, both the Law and the Regulation on Operations specifically
targeted customer registration procedures and transaction limits.
Regarding customer registration, e-money issuers must
comply with these KYC rules: under article 7 of the Regulation on
Operations, to open simplified e-money accounts,55 e-money issuers
must obtain from customers their full name, as contemplated in their
National Identification Number, Foreign Citizen's ID or Passport.56
Issuers must also check the accuracy of this information against Peru's
National Identification and Legal Status Registry Database (known in
Peru as RENIEC) or the Immigration Central Registry Database of the
General Office of Migration and Naturalization ("ICRD").57 Article 7
also provides that whenever e-money services are rendered through
mobile phones, issuers must also obtain the customer's mobile phone
number.58
Transaction limits are addressed in both the Law and the
Regulation on Operations. The Law only imposes one limit, specific-
ally, Article 5 imposes a per transaction limit of one Tax Unit,59 the
equivalent today of 3,700 Peruvian Soles (USD 1,322.38 at the exchange
54 Geoffrey Irungu, CBK Issues Rules to Curb Mobile Money Laundering, BusINESS
DAILY AFRICA (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/CBK+issues+
rules+to+curb+mobile+money+laundering/-/539552/1749304/-/69edoj/-/index.html.
See Regulation on Operations, supra note 33, art. 5-6 (creating two kinds of e-
money accounts: simplified and ordinary. Simplified accounts require less customer
information to be opened but are subject to the amount limits explained in Lesson II B.
Ordinary accounts require more customer information but are only subject to the
limitation in Article 5 of the E-Money Law).
56 Id. at art. 7.
57Id.
58 Id.
59Ley No. 29985 [Peru E-money Law], supra note 22, art. 5.
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rate of USD 2.79 per Sol).60 The Regulation on Operations expanded on
the Law's sole mandate, imposing limits more complex than those M-
PESA placed on itself. Article 5, subsections (b), (c), (d) and (e) lays
them out: no transaction can surpass 1,000 Peruvian Soles (USD 357.4
at the exchange rate of USD 2.79 per Sol);61 the consolidated balance on
e-money accounts held at the same issuer cannot surpass 2,000
Peruvian Soles (USD 714.79 at the exchange rate of USD 2.79 per Sol);62
cash deposits into an e-money account held at the same issuer cannot
surpass 2,000 Peruvian Soles per month;63 and overall transactions
from an e-money account held at the same issuer cannot surpass 4,000
Peruvian Soles per month (USD 1,429.60 at the exchange rate of USD
2.79 per Sol).64
C. What should Peru do?
With such detailed regulation, access to e-money services is
severely restricted, negatively affecting financial inclusion. It seems the
country is overstating the KYC and AML risks involved in the e-
money business and forgetting that the amounts customers would be
moving around are very small. As the Kenyan experience indicates,
these amounts are unlikely to represent a big chunk of Peru's banking
system's float.65 Fortunately, the regulator can provide a huge boost to
financial inclusion without the need to emulate Kenya's self-regulation
strategy. As suggested later in this article, a couple of minor tweaks to
articles 5 and 7 of the Regulation on Operations would surely put to
rest all concerns regarding customer registration and transaction limits.
60 Known in Peru as "UITs," Tax Units have a government-assigned value that is
updated periodically to adjust it to inflation and is mostly used to determine the price
of certain government services.
61 Regulation on Operations, supra note 33, art. 5(b).
62 Id. art. 5(c).
63 Id. art. 5(d).
64 Id. art. 5(e).
65 Claire Alexandre, 10 Things you Though you Knew About M-PESA, CGAP
(November 22, 2010), http://www.cgap.org/blog/10-things-you-thought-you-knew-
about-m-pesa; see Simone di Castri, Mobile Money: Enabling Regulatory Solutions,
GSM Ass'N (Feb. 2013), at 9, (Explaining in detail why KYC and AML risks involved
with e-money are much lower that with regular banking), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2302726.
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Peru has a great opportunity to get ahead of Kenya and
provide remote customer registration, that is, enrollment without
having to pay a visit to an e-money service provider's authorized
agent. To achieve this, all Peru needs to do is eliminate the requirement
of obtaining a customer's full name from Article 7 of the Regulation on
Operations and allow customer registration by simply obtaining the
customer's DNI. The reason is merely technological: e-money issuers
are likely to reach their customers through mobile phones. In order to
render financial services through these devices, the issuer's transaction
processing platform must communicate with the telecom platform and
the phone. The most effective communication tool to achieve this is the
USSD technology because of its capacity to effectively operate even in
the simplest of mobiles devices by communicating through short
messages in real time.66 E-money service providers target mostly low-
income citizens that lack purchasing capacity for a smartphone; there-
fore, being able to reach customers in any kind of device, regardless of
its sophistication, is an absolute must.
USSD can be used to conduct the entire registration process
remotely, but it has its limitations. As it is generally configured to
operate through numerical codes that prompt a response from the
telecom company, redesigning the system to be able to handle a long
alphabetic message containing a person's full name may require a
significant investment that telecom companies may not be willing to
make unless their fess are increased accordingly. This is an expense
that e-money issuers, especially non-bank ones, may not be able to
afford without passing on the costs to consumers. Given that the DNI
is just a number, it would fit perfectly into any telecom's existing USSD
gateway.
But how does opening an e-money account by just providing
the customer's DNI number address Peru's KYC concerns? The answer
is RENIEC. The Regulation on Operations already requires a
crosscheck of customer information against this database. It contains
information on the vast majority of Peruvians, including their full
name and it works by being linked to each person's DNI. Accordingly,
e-money issuers can enroll a customer with just their DNI number and
66 Introduction, MOBICENTS, http://www.mobicents.org/incubator/ussd/intro.html (last
visited Aug. 15, 2013).
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then they can obtain more specific identification information by
running a search on RENIEC, including the customer's full name.67 It
does not make sense to increase e-money services costs on Peruvians
by forcing telecoms to modify their USSD gateways when the solution
is already in Article 7 of the Regulation on Operations, 68 all that is
needed is a few pinpoint subtractions to its wording.
Appropriate transaction limits on e-money accounts are
important because they reduce money laundry risks and enable custo-
mer registration through simpler processes than those existing for
regular bank accounts; however, Peru's limits on transactions go too
far. Here again, its Kenyan counterpart can provide useful guidance
and not specifically on how to approach regulation. Yes, Peru's
regulatory approach is more complex that Kenya's, but that is not were
the problem is. The problem is in the insufficiency of the e-money
account total balance cap that the Regulation on Operations imposes,
severely affecting e-money account's usefulness.
Peru's limit on e-money account's total balance at any time is
USD 357.4;69 M-PESA's self-imposed limit triples that amount, USD
1,144.42.70 It is hard to understand the rationale behind this difference
especially considering that Peru's per capita GDP is much higher than
Kenya's (USD 6,573 for Peru vs. USD 862 for Kenya).71 Also, the Law
imposed a per-transaction limit of USD 1,322.3872 while the Regulation
on Operations severely reduced that limit to USD 357.4.73 These limits
derive from the presumption that e-money customers are low income
users. While that assumption may be true for the majority, e-money
services would be open to all Peruvians, even those with higher
income. Also, once customers become well-acquainted with the service
67 This does not solve the problem for foreign citizens but the Regulation on Opera-
tions does not allow them to open simplified e-money accounts, instead, foreign
citizens can only hold ordinary e-money accounts.
68 Regulation on Operations, supra note 33, art. 6.
69 Id. art. 5(b).
70 Safaricom, http://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/m-pesa-services-tariffs/
tariffs (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
71 The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (last
visited Aug. 15, 2013).
72 Law Regulating the Basic Characteristics of Electronic Money as a Financial
Instrument, supra note 22, art. 5(b).
73 Regulation on Operations, supra note 33, at art. 5(b).
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and their trust grows, it is only natural that they would want to use
their e-money accounts to conduct more and larger transactions,
especially once international remittances are available.74 It is better not
to impose such stiff limits at the outset and instead create broader,
ceiling-like limitations, allowing providers to move up and down as
the business demands. The Law's per transaction limit can be used as a
starting point to set the remaining ceilings.
IV. LESSON 3: PROTECTION WITHOUT SUFFOCATION. THE ISSUE OF
CUSTOMER MONEY PROTECTION
It is not difficult to understand why a government would be
apprehensive of a project involving taking money away from people in
order to virtually store it in electronic accounts not necessarily con-
trolled by banking institutions. Any fraud scandal involving loss of
funds belonging, in most part, to the least affluent sector of the
population could spell political disaster for any administration. But
there is a fine line between the desire to avoid political Armageddon
and suffocating e-money initiatives. The CBK's customer fund protec-
tion strategy constitutes an excellent example of how to properly walk
that line. Once again, its strategy consisted in imposing customer fund
protection measures only after e-money providers had been fully
operative, while maintaining passive oversight of them.
Peru is already putting too much tension on that fine line by
adopting a regulatory approach towards protecting e-money custo-
mer's funds that imposes rigid customer fund protection rules that
make it almost impossible for providers to find cost-effective alter-
natives that would be just as protective.
A. Kenya's customer funds protection approach
Key to any e-money operation is ensuring that customers'
money is adequately protected. E-money is merely a virtual repre-
sentation of actual cash and this cash needs to be stored in safe place.
The safe place of choice is, predictably, a financial institution. Keeping
customers' money in one of these institutions enables providers to
tackle one of the main obstacles that this new business faces: customer
74 With the ever-growing disparity between the Peruvian Sol and the United States
dollar, international remittances can be severely limited.
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trust. This is because financial institutions count with regulatory
protections ensuring customer money is safe, at least to a certain
amount, in case they go belly-up.75
Putting customer money in a bank does not end the discussion.
The conundrum is to find a financial product that would keep this
money safe while at the same time allow providers to thrive. This is an
especially sensitive issue in the case of non-bank e-money issuers like
M-PESA, due to the fact that they are unlikely to have the financial
strength their bank counterparts have. Therefore, the regulator faces
complex questions: should the money be kept in one or more banks?
Should it be kept in a savings or checking account? Should it be held in
a trust account instead? Are customer funds deposits? If so, are they
entitled to interests?
Once again, CBK tackled all these issues by staying true to its
strategy of exercising control through oversight and self-regulation. As
a result of CBK's and Safaricom's joint efforts prior to launch, M-PESA
kept customer funds in a trust account held at a financial institution,
constituting Kenya's approach to fund protection until the CBK's Draft
Regulation came along.76 The way this regulation deals with the issue
evidences how Kenya learned from a now well-developed market to
improve its stand. Instead of keeping the trust account requirement,
Clause 8 only requires e-money issuers to keep customer funds in a
bank approved by the CBK.77 Therefore, if the regulation passes into
law, its Clause 8.1(a) would allow an e-money issuer to maintain the
money at a checking or savings account, as long as the e-money
balance is held separate from balances relating other operations of the
issuer.78
While the CBK has not officially explained the rationale behind
this change, it is likely that the reason was to benefit both non-bank e-
money issuers and consumers. Under the trust account model, these
issuers had to pay the trustee bank its services fee, entailing additional
costs on issuers that negatively affected its pricing. With this new
approach, issuers are not only exempted from paying trustee fees but
7 The Banking Act, (2010) Cap. 488 § 36 (Kenya).
76 ALLIANCE FOR FIN. INCLUSION, supra note 7, at 1, 7.
77 CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, http://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/public-
consultations (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) at clause 8.
Id. clause 8.1(a).
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also, under Clause 8.4, issuers are now entitled to keep for themselves
the interest yielded by a savings account.79
B. Peru's customer funds protection approach
Peru specifically addresses the issue of customer funds protec-
tion in Articles 15 to 17 of the Regulation on Operations and, as
expected, its approach is far more detailed than Kenya's strategy.80 The
following are four aspects stand out: first, there is a rigid mandate for
all e-money issuers-banks and non-banks alike-to form a trust
account and hold within it all cash derived from e-money issuances,
this means there are no alternatives, no possibility to hold funds in
checking or savings accounts;81 second, it defines who must be the
trust's settlor (the e-money issuer) and who must be the trustee (the
bank where the trust account is formed);82 third, e-money issuers are
allowed to invest the funds in the trust account but only to a certain
extent;83 and fourth, perhaps its most controversial aspect, all e-money
issuers must set up this trust account at a financial institution other
that themselves. This is likely to be problematic for banks because they
are entities allowed under Peruvian law to hold trust accounts and
serve as trusteeS84 but, if they decide to enter the e-money business,
Article 15 would force them to open their trust account at one of their
competitors.85
C. What should Peru do?
Peru's thirst for protection is likely to result in increased costs
for providers and higher prices for customers. This is because holding
a trust account will carry with it the additional expense of paying for
trustee's fees and obtaining deposit insurance entails purchasing a
7 Id. clause 8.4.
Regulation on Operations, supra note 33, art. 15-17.
81 Id. art. 15.
82 Id.
83 Id. art. 17.
84 Ley No. 26702, art. 221, 16 Jan. 2013, Ley General del Sistema Financiero y del
Sistema de Seguros y Organica de la Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros, DIARIO
OFICIAL EL PERUANO [E.P.], 17 Jan. 2013 (Peru).[Financial System Law] art. 221
(Peru).
Regulation on Operations, supra note 33, art. 15.
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policy; two costs that providers surely will pass on to consumers. Peru
can easily dodge this bullet and still provide enough protection to
consumers by completely redrafting Article 15.
Article 15 must be completely overhauled for two reasons.
First, it does not provide for alternatives to trust accounts. Trust
accounts are neither the only nor the best device to protect customer
funds. Not only do they result in increased prices to consumers, as
explained in the previous paragraph, but also, the way Article 15
defines the roles in this trust account makes its existence futile. The
point in having e-money funds deposited in a trust account is to have a
trustee manage the funds under the instructions of consumers, thus
taking cash management away from providers; however, under Article
15, providers are the trust account's mandatory settlors.86 Conse-
quently, Peruvian consumers are not enjoying any enhanced protec-
tion by having funds deposited in a trust account. Consumers are just
as effectively served by allowing providers to deposit the funds in any
regular bank account. Kenya certainly learned this lesson as evidenced
in Clause 8.1(a) of CBK's Draft Regulation.87
Second, Article 15 overlooks the difference between bank and
non-bank e-money providers by forcing all e-money issuers to open a
trust account. If bank e-money issuers as opposed to non-bank issuers
are already subject to banking regulations that protect their customer's
funds in case of insolvency,88 what is the purpose of forcing bank e-
money issuers to open a trust account? Moreover, if SBS's interpreta-
tion of Article 15 explained in III B is accurate, then bank e-money
issuers would be forced to open this trust account at a financial
institution other than itself. What increased protection does this
provide? What if the strongest bank in Peru decides to become an e-
money provider? Does this mean that customers would be more
protected by forcing that bank to open a trust account in a less secure
option? What if that option is a direct e-money competitor? This would
make sense if all issuers were forced to deposit funds in at least a
couple trust accounts, in an effort to avoid keeping all eggs in one
basket, but that is not what the Regulation on Operations provides.
86  d.
CENTRAL BANK OF KENYA, http://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/public-
consultations (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) at clause 8.1(a).
Financial System Law, supra note 87, art. 144.
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Moreover, with Article 15, the SBS did not consider that
processing e-money transactions requires reconciliation between the
electronic account and the account where the actual funds are held (to
ensure all e-money issued is backed by real money), if funds are at a
bank different from that processing transactions, then a new
contractual relationship must exist between these two parties, entailing
additional costs for bank issuers and, ultimately, their customers.
This mess can be cleared with two simple amendments. First,
regulators should alter Article 15 to require that all non-bank e-money
issuers present a customer's e-money funds security proposal as a
prerequisite to obtaining SBS' approval as an e-money issuer. This
way, the SBS can leave the door open for different viewpoints on
customer fund security that may actually lead to enhanced protection
while allowing non-bank e-money issuers to operate in a cost-effective
way. Second, bank e-money issuers must be categorized separately
and granted freedom to deposit e-money funds in any way that they
see fit, subject to two limitations: the money must be placed in a
financial institution (including itself) and that the bank e-money issuer
must remain subject to the investment limitations that Article 17
already contemplates.89
V. CONCLUSION
Kenya recognized its financial inclusion issue and acted
properly when a potential solution presented itself.. It was wise to
acknowledge that e-money initiatives would not survive without a
thriving market. While Kenya could not, by itself, ensure that such
market would rise and succeed, it was careful to ensure that failure
would not be through its own doing. With this in mind, Kenya stepped
out of the way of a business it knew little about, while it kept a vigilant
eye on providers to help make sure Kenyan's received what was
expected.
Peru's premises are exactly the same. Its financial inclusion
numbers are troubling, it has several e-money providers offering
solutions to the problem but it has very limited knowledge about how
to make this financial inclusion project gain national prominence. If all
the ingredients are there and M-PESA's recipe for success is open for
" Regulation on Operations, supra note 33, art. 17.
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the world to see, why is Peru's regulatory reaction so radically
different from Kenya's? Although logic does not provide an answer for
Peru's deviation, politics may likely be responsible. For president
Humala, being credited as the first leader to successfully tackle the
problem of financial exclusion in the country is an accomplishment
that promises to pay sizeable political rewards. Judging by its
behavior, it seems his administration believes that the most effective
way to attain this goal is by extensively regulating; however, as the
Kenyan experience suggests, president Humala's political interest
could be best served if his administration relaxes its regulatory stands,
focusing on creating an environment proper for e-money providers to
prosper.
Despite having extensive regulation already in force, Peru can
still create this environment by, first, changing its overall strategy and
follow Kenya's "laissez-faire" approach, relying on provider's self-
regulation, guided by market experience. This should help establishing
an e-money market from which all parties involved can benefit.
Second, easing customer registration requirements and transaction
limits to boost e-money services' penetration; financial inclusion is just
a chimera unless e-money services reach as many Peruvians as
possible. Lastly, freeing providers from fund protection measures that
would only suffocate them while increasing customer prices.
In sum, as Kenya shows, e-money as a financial inclusion tool
can go a long way by simply being less active, focusing on passive
oversight and inviting providers to self-regulate. Only time will tell if
Peru is willing to learn from Kenya's recent history; in the meantime,
millions of Peruvians have no other option than to keep transacting in
cash, excluded from the financial world.
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